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Abstract
For the purpose of estimating demand functions, economists have
developed a broad range of models, which are as idiosyncratic as are
the markets they describe. The objective of my thesis is to explore
possibilities to estimate residential demand for internet access in Aus-
tria. Two models will be presented, each situated at the very opposite
ends of the spectrum. They differ with respect to some fundamen-
tal assumptions concerning the nature of the market - such as the
homogeneity or heterogeneity of the goods -, the level of aggregation
requiring different sources of data, and a number of other specifica-
tions. The first model is based on a simple macro-level setting and will
assume homogenous goods. This framework, however, is of limited use
for most research questions, and thus motivates the application of the
much richer and more powerful second model. It considers a differen-
tiated product market and is based on a micro-level model of discrete
choice. Even within the family of discrete choice models, there re-
mains a wide range of possible frameworks. The identification of the
most suitable given the unique characteristics of the market and data
availability is the purpose of the final chapters.
1 Introduction
It is the art of the econometrician to create an adequate model of a mar-
ket. The specific characteristics have to be taken into account. Consider the
market for internet access, for example. Due to the extraordinary rate of dif-
fusion, which is likely without a parallel in the history of technological change
and the dramatic development of applications for internet access, a model
that considers observations over time can hardly be applied. Internet access
in the year 2000 was an entirely different product than in the year 2008. This
fact prohibits the use of panel data. Other important idiosyncrasies on which
model selection was based includes, among others: the binary nature of the
decision to acquire internet access, the limited number of supplied goods,
and the fact that most internet connections are not transportable.
Without claiming to have found the most suitable model, nor to possess
an exhaustive number of possible models I will pick two very different settings
and undertake a comparative analysis of each. The first model represents
the starting point of the work. Among others, it will be based on the very
limiting maintained assumption of homogenous goods. The relaxation of
this assumption comes at a high cost. We will see how the assumption of
differentiated products leads to a much more demanding framework. The
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initial chapters will highlight the maintained assumptions that lead to the
models and compare them with regard to explanatory power and suitability.
2 Model Selection
The most critical question is whether the goods are considered homogenous or
heterogeneous. In the case of internet access this question is not as straight-
forward as it may look. Both positions are to some extent justified. From
a technical perspective, internet access consists of information packages sent
from the user to internet hubs. Even though they can be delivered by means
of different technologies the very nature of the good is the same. However,
if internet goods are effectively perfect substitutes, one will fail to find an
explanation for observed differences in price. They are a good indicator for
whether two goods belong to the same market or not. From the consumer’s
perspective internet access is as heterogeneous as are its applications. These
include: the obtaining of information, communication, audio and video en-
tertainment and online gaming. On the lower end of the spectrum of internet
users stands the person whose main use for the internet is reading the news-
paper and obtaining information. He will very likely consider all types of
internet access equal, thus price will play a role. He even has close substi-
tutes such as real newspapers and other means of communication. On the
other extreme of the spectrum there is the online gamer, who is hungry for
bandwidth and download volume. There exists no close substitute for his
use of the internet. The mentioned applications require completely differ-
ent speeds and volumes and therefore a slight difference in the speed of the
internet connection can completely alter the possibilities of its use. Speed
and volume are however not the only means of active product differentiation.
Mobility as in the case of internet via HSDPA technology, the provision of
email addresses, web space, or the setting the overbooking factor are other
important means.
In any case, the decision whether to assume homogenous or heterogeneous
goods for modelling purposes will most likely be based on the intention of
estimating demand. This underlying purpose will shape the basic outlines
of the model in use. A wise researcher will chose a model that is sufficiently
complex to capture all the required entities involved in answering his ques-
tion but also keep it as simple as possible. Consider the following example:
For the purpose of defining a market - a necessary step in any market survey
- the researcher will be interested in the extent to which consumers react to
a price change of one good by switching to a similar good. In this case it
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makes no sense to assume homogenous goods. For purposes, for which the
elasticities between the goods in the market are irrelevant, the assumption
of homogenous goods will simplify the model dramatically.
Model number one stands in the neo-classical tradition. It will attempt to
uncover price and income demand elasticities for broadband internet access
from market data under the assumption of a perfectly competitive equilib-
rium. The most critical maintained assumption is that broadband internet
goods are perfect substitutes and represent a market of its own. As a conse-
quence there exists only one market price which is the one that we observe.
Market demand will have the general form:
Q = f(P, ...) (1)
P = g(Q, ..)
Model number two will assume heterogeneous goods and will include all
internet connections, not only broadband. A differentiated n product mar-
kets consequently requires a system of n demand functions
P1 = f(Q1, ..., Qn, ...) (2)
...
Pn = f(Q1, ..., Qn, ...)
Q1 = g(P1, ..., Pn, ...)
...
Qn = g(P1, ..., Pn, ...)
and a system of n supply functions - usually derived from first order
profit maximising conditions. I will now briefly present one possible version
of framework (1) in order to illustrate its limitations. This will serve as a
motivation for the introduction of model number two.
2.1 Model One
Model One will attempt to uncover price and income elasticities from cross-
country data. To reduce unobserved cross-country heterogeneity I have only
included data of the 30 OECD member countries, which constitute a fairly
homogenous group. The only proxy I used to capture country differences
was GDP in PPP dollars. This approach may seem a little bit strange, after
all I am interested in elasticities for Austria. The most promising setting
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for my purpose would have probably been one using regional Austrian data
- comparing the prices and quantities of internet access by province or even
township. Unfortunately, this data did not show sufficient variation in price
to have any explanatory power. This is probably due to the size of Austria
and the fact that most suppliers offer one price for the whole country. Also
it is not clear whether the assumption of homogeneity of people within one
province of Austria is less problematic. This issue is clearly a result of the
macro-level approach to demand estimation. It will again be raised in the
next chapter where we will see how the second model deals with it.
I will use a simple log-linear model of demand and supply with the fol-
lowing structure:
lnQi = a+ b(lnPi) + c(lnYi) + ei (3)
lnPi = α + β ln(Di) + i (4)
Qi denotes a measure of the quantity of internet access and Pi a measure
of the price. Yi is a proxy for real income and ei and i are well behaved
stochastic error terms. In order to fix the endogeneity problem I have added
Di - population density of country i - as an instrument for supply. The intu-
ition for this is the following: A high population density will reduce the per
capita infrastructure costs for bandwidth connections and therefore stand
as a proxy for the cost of supply. A more detailed explanation of the vari-
ables can be found in table (2.1). The results of the 2-stage least squares
Variable Description Mean St.Dev. Data Source
Q: bb pen Broadband penetration 21.58 8.86 OECD, 2006
(subscribers per 100 inhabitants)
P1: pri sub Average broadband monthly subscription price 52.32 13.74 OECD, 2006
P2: pri mb Average broadband monthly price OECD, 2006
per advertised Mbit/s
Y: gdp ppp GDP per capita price power parity 32222 11425 World Bank, 2006
D: pop den Population density (inhabitants per km2 133.91 124.62 OECD, Dec 2007
Table 1: Data Sample
estimation can be found in table (2.1). The model delivered fairly robust
results. Slight modifications in the model specification did not alter the out-
come completely. I also tried two different proxies for the price of broadband
internet, delivering the same results. The explanatory power of this simple
model was excellent. The adjusted R2 was in the order 0.6 in most models.
The coefficients had the expected sign prompted by economic theory and
were highly significant. Any undertaken expansions of the model with some
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ln bb pen ln bb price ln gdp ppp Constant
Coefficiant -0.992347 1.360549 -7.159
t-Value -2.31 7.86 -4.44
P> |t| 0.029 0.000 0.000
Adjusted R2 = 0.6977 F-statistic = 0.0000 Observations: 30
Table 2: Results of the 2-Stage Least Squares Estimation
additional variables such as country dummies or broadband speed did not
prove successful. They did either not add any explanatory power or the sign
lacked plausibility.
The result can be interpreted as follows: The average OECD broadband
price elasticity is approximately -1. This implies that a 10 % increase in price
would decrease demand by 10%. The average OECD income elasticity is ap-
proximately 1.4. This indicates that a 10% increase in the average income
would increase demand by 14%. Broadband access at home still seems not
to be affordable for everybody.
Depending on the purpose of research this model can be too limited with
respect to the assumption that goods as well as consumers are homogenous.
As a result of the homogeneity of goods assumption, which is a nontestable
maintained assumption, one has to calculate the averages of broadband prices
within a country. Although broadband internet access is offered in a variety
of different packages, including different speed, and volume, they were consid-
ered all the same and averages were calculated. By deleting variation within a
country a lot of useful information was lost. Additionally our model does also
not allow us to shed light on substitution patterns between broadband and
non-broadband internet, or to differentiate between mobile and non mobile
broadband. Another problematic assumption of this model was that price
was the only differentiating feature between OECD countries. This means
that consumer’s preferences were assumed to be generally equal. Therefore, I
will introduce a much richer model of the market for Austrian internet goods
in the following chapters that can account for both differentiated goods as
well as differences in consumers tastes.
The only real difficulty in Model One is how to solve the endogeneity
problem. Demand parameters can be consistently estimated in the presence
of unobserved demand factors via the use of traditional instrumental variables
methods. In framework (2) another problem arises. The sheer number of
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parameters to be estimated can become burdensome. Consider a model of
demand that only includes price elasticities.
Definition 1 (Cross/Own-Price Elasticity)
Ei,j = ∂Qi
∂Pj
Pj
Qi
(5)
A set of n goods renders n2 price elasticities to be estimated. Therefore
it will be necessary to introduce some kind of a structure that includes the
use of a richer data set than just price and quantity information. This can
be achieved in many ways. The chosen approach will impose such structure
basing demand on a micro level model of consumer choice. The underlying
behavioral model - the Random Utility Model which will be introduced in the
next chapter - will explain the utility a consumer derives from the acquisition
of a product with a set of product characteristics and a set of socio-economic
data of the consumer standing as proxies for his individual taste. These
utilities will render the probability of a consumer choosing a certain internet
connection given his personal attributes. Disaggregate individual demand
can then be aggregated to deliver market level demand. This was first done
by Goldberg (1995) (3). In this pioneering work she developed the following
structure: qej , the demand for good j is equal to the sum over all households
or individual of the probabilities that alternative j was chosen.
Qc =
∑
i∈I
P(agent i buys product c) =
∑
i∈I
Ψ(p1, ..., pn,x1, ...,xn,ωi, θ) (6)
Ψ(p,x1, ...,xn,ωi, θ) are the (Nested) Logit choice probabilities that depend
on the price p and non price attributes x of all goods, as well as a set of
socio-economic variables standing as proxies for household i’s taste, and a
distribution θ.
In the following third chapter I will introduce random utility models and
derive the very popular Logit and Nested Logit model. This introduction will
go as far as is necessary for the basic understanding of the model I will use
for estimation. I would like to recommend the book Discrete Choice Methods
by Kenneth Train (4) to the reader interested in a more thorough discussion
of discrete choice models.
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3 Discrete Choice Models
3.1 Introduction
Discrete Choice Models have been developed to model the decision of an
agent consisting of a choice made among a finite set of alternatives. Many
decisions is real life are of this kind. Classic examples include the decision
whether participate in the labour market or not, consumer choices in mar-
kets such as the transportation market, the market for insurances, and - not
surprisingly - the market for internet goods. One cannot purchase half a
broadband connection and it rarely makes sense to purchase more than one.
The discreteness can be considered a bias towards countable numbers and
makes estimation more difficult.
The regular linear regression models tends to fail to capture the specific
nature of discrete decisions. Linear models of the form P(Eventjoccurs) =
F (Parameters) - Linear Probability Models - have been developed. They,
however, have a number of shortcomings. See Greene(2003)6, for exam-
ple. The setting P(Y = 1|x) = F (x,β) and P(Y = 0|x) = F (x, β) with
F (x,β) = x′β will lead to heteroscedasticity. The variance of  is a function
of β.
In order to model the decision making process of individuals, we will have
to make specific assumptions. We will distinguish here among assumptions
about
 The decision-maker: (I) These assumptions define who is the decision-
maker, and what are his/her characteristics. In many situation it is not
clear whether the decison-maker is a person, a household or the board
of a company. This assumption is often more critical than it may seem.
Our example of internet access is a perfect example. Whereas regular
internet connections are usually shared by the members of a household,
mobile internet is more often acquired by an individual. The following
questions need to be answered: Who is the decision making person in
the household? What socio-economic data can be considered to char-
acterize them both?
 The alternatives: (C) These assumptions determine the possible op-
tions of the decision-maker. To fit within a discrete choice framework,
the set of alternatives, called the choice set, needs to exhibit three char-
acteristics. First, the alternatives must be mutually exclusive from the
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decision makers perspective. Choosing one alternative necessarily im-
plies not choosing any of the other alternatives. The decision maker
chooses only one alternative from the choice set. Second, the choice set
must be exhaustive, in that all possible alternatives are included. The
decision maker necessarily chooses one of the alternatives. Third, the
number of alternatives must be finite. The researcher can count the
alternatives and eventually be finished counting.4
The essential assumption of a mutually exclusive choice set - basically
meaning that every agent can only choose one alternative out of this
set - is not very restrictive since the choice set can be expanded to
include multiple good alternatives. Think of an agent that decides to
use broadband internet at home and additionally has a mobile internet
connection when travelling. All that needs to be done is to expand
the choice set with this alternative. Then ’Broadband only’, ’Mobile
only’ and ’both BB and Mobile’ are all separate alternatives. A similar
method can be applied in order to satisfy the second assumption. By
simply adding the alternative ’none of the other alternatives’,which ba-
sically means that the agent has no internet connection, one can assure
that the choice set is exhaustive. If there was no outside option the
agents of our model would be forced to choose an alternative. Firstly
this is not what we observe in reality and secondly this would render
implausible consumer behaviour e.g. the choice is dependent only on
the difference in prices of the goods and not the absolute prices. The
third assumption actually is restrictive. A situation where an agent
has infinitely many alternatives to choose from cannot be captured by
a discrete choice model. This condition is the defining characteristic of
discrete choice models and distinguishes them from a regular regression.
In our case the set of alternatives will include: C = {Cable, ADSL,
Mobile, DialUp and No Internet}.
 The attributes: These assumptions identify the attributes of each
potential alternative that the decision-maker is taking into account to
make his/her decision. The question what attributes matter to an
individual is a crucial issue. It involves extensive inquiry by the ana-
lyst possibly involving questioning consumers. In the case of internet
goods one can imagine the following characteristics to be of impor-
tance: Speed, Price, Download limits, less obvious but possibly also
important: the corporate image of the company, customer service, ....
In practice the availability of data and/or the possibility to quantify
a certain characteristic will have a big impact on which attributes the
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analyst includes in his model.
However, not only the attributes of the alternative matter in the deci-
sion process. The underlying consideration for a decision differ strongly
between agents. This variation in consumer taste can rarely be ob-
served. Therefore the analyst uses socio-economic parameter serving
as proxies in order to reflect the heterogeneity of the agents. One of
the main challenges is to capture as much information as possible in
order to minimize the unobserved heterogeneity and reduce it to pure
noise.
 The decision rules: They describe the process used by the decision-
maker to reach his/her choice.
Discrete choice models are based on an underlying behavioural model
which attempts to explain the variation in people’s behaviour. The
complexity of human behaviour,however, suggests that a choice model
should explicitly capture some level of uncertainty. The neoclassical
economic theory fails to do so. The exact source of uncertainty is an
open question. Some models assume that the decision rules are intrin-
sically stochastic, and even a complete knowledge of the problem would
not overcome the uncertainty. Others consider that the decision rules
are deterministic, and motivate the uncertainty from the impossibility
of the analyst to observe and capture all dimensions of the problem,
due to its high complexity. This question will further be addressed in
the chapter on nested Logit models.
While the source of the variability of human behaviour is open to debate
we will proceed with the assumption that agents are able to compare
any two alternatives and choose the alternative from which they de-
rive the most utility. This behaviour is referred as utility maximising
behaviour and is an essential assumption of Random Utility (Maximi-
sation) Models (RUM).
3.2 Random Utility Models
Consider a situation where an agent is supposed to choose from a set of
alternatives. Since he is assumed to have perfect discriminatory capability he
will choose the alternative from which he derives the most utility. Therefore
the probability that agent i chooses alternative a from a set of choices C is
given by
Pi,a = P(Ui,a = max
c∈C
Ui,c) (7)
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The agent chooses option a if and only if Ua ≥ Uc,∀c ∈ C. From the
analyst’s perspective the utility that the agent derives from this option is
unobservable. What he can observe, however, is a set of attributes of the al-
ternatives y and a set of characteristics of the agent zi that have explanatory
power with regard to the agent’s utility. Let xi,a := (y, zi). Due to the exis-
tence of unobserved entities it is therefore necessary to distinguish between
the real utility Ui,a of agent i and that part of utility that can be explained
by observable attributes Vi,a, which I will refer to as the deterministic part of
utility. Therefore Ui,a 6= Vi,a This difference stems from four different sources
of uncertainty: unobserved alternative attributes, unobserved individual at-
tributes, measurement errors and proxy, or instrumental, variables.5. In
order to reflect this uncertainty utility is modelled as a random variable.
Ui,a = Vi,a + i,a
The utility of agent i chosing option a is given by a determined part
Vi,a and a stochastic part i,a. They are assumed to be independent and
additive (maintained assumption). The deterministic part is a function of
both characteristics of the agent as well as attributes of the alternative.
Vi,a = F (yi,a, zi)
Since it should be clear by now that we are dealing with probabilities on
the level of an agent i will drop the subscript i for notational simplicity! The
probability that decision maker i chooses option a is
Pa = P(Ua > Uc,∀c 6= a) =
P(Va + a > Vc + c, ∀c 6= a) =
P(a − c > Vc − Va,∀c 6= a)
Agent i will choose alternative a if the differences in the unobserved part of
utility makes up for the difference in observed utility. A look at this equation
reveals two interesting characteristics of RUMs. First, only differences in
utility matter. If a constant is added to every utility, the outcome of the
decision process should not be altered. Secondly, there is no natural scale for
utility. If all utilities are multiplied by a constant, again probabilities should
not change. Random utility models therefore require normalization, an issue
that will be brought up in chapter (3.5).
Denoting the joint vector of random terms as  = (1, 2, ..., n) (one for
every element of the choice set) with a density function f() and by using
the indicator function 1[.] that takes the value 1, whenever the expression in
the brackets is true and 0 if not, the probability can be rewritten as:
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Pa =
∫

1[a − c > Vc − Va,∀c 6= a]f()d
The choice probability is the n-1 dimensional integral over the distribution
of the difference of the error terms. Up to this point the model was kept as
general as possible. In order to make a Random Utility Model operational
it will be necessary to make a maintained assumption concerning both the
distribution of the random terms and the functional form of deterministic
utility. The attribute ’maintained’ stresses the fact that this assumption
cannot be tested and will remain an assumption. It is not possible to clarify
whether the distribution fits the data or not.
Whereas deterministic utility is almost always modelled as a linear function
Vi,a = x
′β, the decision about the distribution of the random term is not as
straigthforward and will be the critical assumption by which we differentiate
between different discrete choice models.
Any continuous probability distribution will do. The most widely used 6
are the logarithmic and the normal distribution delivering the Logit and
the Probit model respectively. The assumption of jointly normal distributed
error terms seems very natural. However it comes with the disadvantage
that estimation requires the solution of multidimensional integrals since the
normal distribution does not have a closed form. This causes computational
difficulties which deters many researchers from the Probit model. The most
common discrete choice model is,therefore, the
3.3 The Logit Model
The Logit model is obtained by assuming that all random terms are identi-
cally and independently distributed Extreme Value of type one.
c ∼ EV 1 ∀c ∈ C
Note that sofar the cs were indexed in recognition that the stochastic
component can be different across alternatives. They may be correlated
between pairs of alternatives and have different distributions. However, by
introducing assumption (3.3) the error terms will be not cross-correlated and
identically distributed. As a consequence we will be able to drop the subscript
of the s.
The Generalized Extreme Value Distribution of Type 1 (1) - also referred to
Gumbel 1 distribution - has a density function given by
f() = e−e−e

1Emil Julius Gumbel (1891 - 1966)
3 DISCRETE CHOICE MODELS 16
and cumulative density given by
F () = e−e

Figure 1: The Gumbel Distribution
The variance of the Extreme Value type 1 distribution is pi2/6. This has
important consequences for the normalization of the model, an issue we will
come back to later. The difference between two draws of GEV type 1 vari-
ables has a logistic distribution with the distribution function and cumulative
distribution respectively
c − d =: ∗cd ∼ Log
F (∗i,cd) =
e
∗
i,cd
1 + e
∗
i,cd
The Multinomial Logistic distribution is very close to the normal distribu-
tion with slightly fatter tails. The critical part of the assumption is that the
unobserved factors are uncorrelated over alternatives, as well as having the
same variance for all alternatives. While this assumption is very restrictive it
delivers a very convenient form for the choice probability. Logit is by far the
most widely used discrete choice model due to its mathematical convenience.
However, the assumption of independence can be inappropriate in some sit-
uations.A correlation between error terms basically means that there is some
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similarity between two different alternatives which was not sufficiently cap-
tured by the chosen explanatory variables. In many cases this is caused by a
lack of data. Put in other words: The objection for the analyst is to model
utility sufficiently well, as to reduce the random terms to white noise. If there
is correlation between the error terms, the chosen explanatory variables for
utility do not have sufficient explanatory power. This problem can be fixed
by either trying to find a more suitable model to explain utility or by relaxing
the assumption of iid error terms, which will lead to the Generalized Extreme
Value Model, introduced in chapter 3.7.
3.4 Derivation of the Logit Model Probabilities follow-
ing McFadden (1974)
Starting point is the general behavioural model developed in (3.2) where
agent i chooses alternative a only when its utility is greater than of other
alternative.
P(a + Va > c + Vc, ∀c 6= a) =
P(c < a + Va − Vc,∀c 6= a)
The assumption of iid random terms will lead to a cumulative distribution
which is simply the product of cumulative distribution functions.
Pa|a =
∏
c 6=a
e−e
−(c+Vc−Va)
The probability that option a is chosen is therefore the product of probabil-
ities that a is greater than c − Va + Vc ∀c. Therefore the probability of
alternative a being chosen is the expected utility of that alternative, which is
obtained by calculating the integral over all values of a and weighing them
by their densities.
Pa =
∫ ∞
−∞
(∏
c 6=a
e−e
−(b+Vb−Va)
)
e−ae−e
a
da
Solving the integral, which is done in appendix (.1), will deliver the following
expression
Pa =
eVa∑
c∈C e
Vc
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Assuming that V is linear Va = x
′β, we can finally write the closed form
expression for the probabilities of the Logit Model.
Pa =
ex
′
aβ∑
c∈C e
x′cβ
(8)
Throughout this work we will refer to equation (8) as the Logit model. In
the literature, although the nomenclature is not consistent, often the dif-
ferentiation is made between the Multinomial Logit model (MNL) and the
Conditional Logit model (CL). This work will refer to the MNL as a spe-
cial case of the CL model where all attributes are individual specific. This
convention is consistent with the software of choice, STATA, where the com-
mands are clogit and mlogit, respectively.
Note that by regarding expression (8) one can see that the Logit model sat-
isfies
lim
x′β→+∞
P(Y = a|x) = 1
lim
x′β→−∞
P(Y = a|x) = 0
and is therefore more adequate in estimating probabilities than linear prob-
ability models which had the problem that ’probabilities’ were not confined
to [0, 1]. Y stands for the stochastic decision process.
3.5 Normalization
First we will see that only differences in utility matter - a consequence of
our underlying behavioural model - and that this has several important im-
plications for the identification and specification of discrete choice models.
Consider for example a set of explanatory variables that include
3.5.1 Socio-Economic Variables
We would like to use both alternative specific attributes as well as individual
specific attributes to properly explain the decision process. For illustration
purposes, remember that we have distinguished between the two. Let x =
(y, z), where y stands for attributes of the alternatives and z stand for the
characteristics of the individual. Integrating this in (8) delivers
Pa =
ey
′
aβy+z
′
aβz∑
j e
y′aβy+z′aβz
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This illustrates the fact that attributes that are constants over alternatives
do not affect probabilities. Stated in a more intuitive way: only differences
in utility matter when chosing from a choice set, not absolute values. If we
add a constant k to every determined part of utility Vc = x
′β + kc, ∀c ∈ C
then the differences between the utilities will not change and the decision
of the agent is unaffected. This has important consequences for our model.
If we want to incorporate individual specific characteristics which are by
nature constant over all alternatives, we will have to modify our model. One
method is to create a set of dummy variables for the choices an multiply them
with the constant. Hereby we allow the coefficient to vary across choices
instead of the characteristics. Another way to incorporate individual specific
characteristics is the following: Suppose that the income of agent i (y) is one
of the socio-economic characteristics in z, with which we attempt to explain
consumption choices for internet goods. The price pc of alternative c is one
the parameters in y. Then using price relative to income pc/yi instead of
incorporating them separately will do the trick. It incorporates both effects:
utility of alternative a (Va) will decrease if the price increases and increase
when it becomes relatively cheaper.
The fact that only relative utilities matter also has identification issues.
3.5.2 Normalization of the Constant
When we specify the observed part of utility as Vc = x
′β + kc,∀c ∈ C
with kc being a constant specific to alternative c. kc can be interpreted as
representing the average impact of all unincluded variables of our model on
utility. These constants have the important task to ensure that the mean of
the c is 0. However, since only the differences between the utilities matter, it
is possible to add any additional constant δ to kc, yielding k˜c := kc+δ without
changing the probabilities. Any model with the same differences is equivalent.
As far as estimation is concerned, it is impossible to estimate these constants
since there is an infinite number of δ with deliver the same utilities. However,
this problem can easily be avoided by performing a harmless normalization.
Simply set ka = 0 for any a. The constant can then be interpreted as the
average impact of unincluded variables relative to good a.
3.5.3 The Scale of Utility is Irrelevant
Since utility has no natural scale, we can also multiply utility Ua with a con-
stant λ without affecting the outcome of the model. The order of alterna-
tives with respect to the utility they yield will be unaffected by a homogenous
transformation. Therefore the equations Ua = Va+a and Ua = λVa+λa are
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equivalent in that respect. However, the scale of utility is not irrelevant when
it comes to interpreting the result of the estimation. An innocent normal-
ization is therefore necessary and is usually obtained by simply normalizing
the variance of the error terms. This is equivalent to normalizing the scale
of utility because, when multiplying utility with λ alters the variance of the
error term by a factor λ2. For the Logit model where error terms are inde-
pendent and identically distributed the standard normalization is achieved
by setting the variance to pi
2
6
, which is chosen for convenience.
3.6 Strengths and Weaknesses of the Logit Model
The capability to capture taste variations between agents is one of its greatest
features. Households can attach varying importance to different attributes
of the alternatives. Whereas households with a high demand for multimedia
applications consider bandwidth the most important criteria, low income
households put more weight on the price of the internet connection. The
Logit model can incorporate systematic variations in tastes, but will fail
when taste varies with non-observed attributes or even randomly.
The greatest strength of the Logit model, however, is that it delivers simple
closed form probabilities. This basically means that no further calculations
are necessary to obtain the desired probabilities. However the simplicity of its
closed form (8) is also a consequence of an often limiting assumption - namely
the assumption of uncorrelated error terms. Only under this assumption do
Logit probabilities have such a convenient form. This assumptions leads to
a property called the
3.6.1 Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
A critical property of the Mulitnomial Logit model is the Independence of
Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). It can be stated as follows: The ratio of the
probabilities of any two alternatives is independent of the choice set. That
is,
Definition 1 (IIA) for any choice sets S and T such that S ⊆ T ⊆ C, for
any alternative a and b in S, we have
PS(a)
PS(b)
=
PT (a)
PT (b)
(9)
It can easily be seen that the Logit model fulfills this criteria. For any two
alternatives a, b from our choice set C the relative probabilities are:
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Pa
Pb
=
eVa/
∑
c∈C e
Vc
eVb/
∑
c∈C e
Vc
=
=
eVa
eVb
= eVa−Vb
Since the relative probabilities of any two alternatives a and b only depend
on their own characteristics and are completely independent of the existence
of other alternatives, the Logit model is said to exhibit the feature of Inde-
pendence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA).
3.6.2 Substitution Patterns
The IIA assumption will imply restrictive (and sometimes unrealistic) substi-
tution patterns between the alternatives in our choice set. Consider a change
in an attribute of one alternative. This will necessarily alter the probability
of both this good as well as the probability of the other goods. Suppose for
the sake of illustration a decrease in the price of cable internet. This will
increase the probability of cable internet being chosen and since the probabil-
ities of all goods necessarily have to sum up to one, decrease the probability
of the other goods to be chosen. Consumers will substitute between goods
in the choice set, in our case some consumers will move from other forms of
internet to cable. The Logit model implies a certain pattern of substitution
across alternatives - proportional substitution. The cross elasticity in a Logit
model has the form2:
Ea,b = −βxxbPb (10)
Where βx =
∂Va
∂xb
the change in deterministic utility of good a when an at-
tribute x (the price) of good b changes. This cross elasticity is the same for
all goods. Therefore an increase in the probability of cable internet of 20%
will lead to a decrease of 20% for all alternatives. Furthermore, the relative
probabilities of all other goods remain the same. This substitution pattern
seems unrealistic in the case of internet products. Intuition would prompt
us to believe that a price reduction of cable internet, which is a broadband
product, will have a stronger affect on the probability of another broadband
product (e.g. ADSL) than on mobile internet. Therefore, proportionate
shifting, a manifestation of the IIA property, may deliver biased forecasts.
This is clearly the most problematic weakness of the Logit model which we
will deal with in the following chapter.
2see Derivation of Cross Elasticities for the Logit Model in the Appendix
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3.6.3 Testing for IIA
Until now we have argued that proportional substitution patterns do not
”seem” realistic. Sound economic research requires that we test for this
attribute. The definition of IIA also provides a way to test for whether a
data set satisfies the IIA condition or not. The model can be reestimated
using only a subset of alternatives D ⊂ C. Since the relative probabilities
of any two alternatives are supposed to be independent of the existence of
other options, the estimates obtained from a subset should deliver the same
probabilities as from the original set. This method is referred to as the
Hausman test and its statistic can be written
(βs − βf )′[Vs − Vf ]−1(βs − βf ) ∼ χ2
where the subscript s indicates that the estimators where based on the re-
stricted set of alternatives and f indicates that the full choice set was used.
V is the covariance matrix of parameters.
3.6.4 Estimation
This model is solved by Maximum Likelihood. The coefficients β are ob-
tained by maximising the log likelihood function, which means identifying
those coefficients which makes the set observations most likely. This pro-
cess involves multidimensional numerical methods such as variations of the
Newton Method. McFadden demonstrated that the log-likelihood function
with these choice probabilities is globally concave in parameters beta, and
therefore the solution exists and is unique.2
LL(β) =
∑
i
∑
c∈C
1i ln Pc
Where 1 is an indicator function taking the value one if agent i chooses
alternative c and zero if not.
3.7 Generalized Extreme Value Models
Using the market for internet access as an example, I have argued that pro-
portional substitution seems unrealistic. It does not seem compatible with
observed decision behaviour. To overcome these restrictive substitution pat-
terns between alternatives, that are a result of the IIA assumption, we will
extend our model and relax this assumption. This led to the development of
Generalized Extreme Value Models. They constitute a large class of models
with the unifying attribute, that the unobserved portions of utility for all
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alternatives are jointly distributed generalized extreme value. This distribu-
tion is a generalization of the univariate extreme value distribution which
has the critical attribute, that it allows for correlations over alternatives.
Definition 1 (Generalized Extreme Value Models (GEV)) Consider
a function G = G(x1, x2, ..., xm) with Gc :=
∂G
∂xc
. If the function G satisfies
the following conditions:
 G is nonnegative. G(x1, ..., xm) ≥ 0 ∀xc
 G is homogeneous-of-degree-one. G(ρx1, ..., ρxm) = ρG(x1, ..., xm) ρ ∈
R+
 G →∞ when xc →∞ ∀c.
 for (i1, ...ik) ⊆ (1, ...,m), ∂kG∂xi1 ,...,∂xik is nonnegative if k is odd and non-
positive if k is even.
Then
Pc =
eVcGc
G
(11)
defines a probabilistic choice model from alternatives c = 1, ...,m, which is
consistent with utility maximisation.
This definition of the class of models is given by McFadden (1978). It con-
stitutes a very formal approach to GEV, basically defining a class of models
over a class of functions with the stated attributes. The amount of intuition
behind these attributes is very little, however, at the same time it accurately
defines the GEV family. McFadden has proven that any function satisfying
the above conditions, delivers a probabilistic choice model.
The Logit model is a member of this class. It arises when all correlations
between alternatives are zero. In that case the GEV distribution is simply
the product of independent extreme value distributions. The Logit choice
probabilities are derived from (11) in Appendix (.3).
In the following two sections the Nested Logit Model will be introduced.
The first approach will be an intuitive one, explaining the basic idea behind
the model. Then the choice probabilities of the Nested Logit model will be
derived from the basic form of GEV models (11).
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3.7.1 The Nested Logit Model
The Nested Logit model is the most common member of the GEV family.
This is due to the simplicity of its functional form, which still allows to in-
corporate a broad range of substitution patterns. It has found applications
in various fields such as transportation research, logistics, marketing and will
also be the models of our choice. The idea of the Nested Logit model lies
in the grouping of ”similar” alternatives into nests and thus structuring the
alternatives. Similarity can - in this case - be characterized by correlation
of the random terms - the sum of all unobserved attributes. If the random
terms of two alternatives in the choice set correlate significantly then the
econometrician has to conclude that there are similarities between these al-
ternatives he was not able to capture with his chosen explanatory variables.
The IIA condition will not hold. If this is the case one can try to group these
alternatives to a subset with the hope that - considering they are similar in
nature - the random terms of the probabilities in this subset are pure white
noise.
The NLM is appropriate whenever the set of alternatives C can be divided
into disjoint subsets - called nests N = {N1, ..., Nk} with the properties
Ni ∩ Nj = ∅, ∀i 6= j and
⋃
j Nj = C and the IIA assumption holds within
nests but does not have to hold across nests.
Cov(a, b) 6= 0, ∀a, b ∈ Nj
Cov(a, b) = 0, ∀a ∈ Ni and b ∈ Nj, i 6= j
To turn back to our example, suppose there are five different internet con-
nections available. ADSL, Cable, Narrowband, MobileInternet, and NoInt-
ernet. The observed substitution behaviour has the feature that whenever
MobileInternet or Narrowband are taken out of the choice set, the prob-
abilities of the two broadband connections (ADSL and Cable) increase by
the same percentage. They however change by different percentages than
the other alternatives. Then ADSL and Cable fulfill the IIA criteria - the
relative probability of the two alternatives is irrelevant of the choice set.
PS(ADSL)
PS(Cable)
=
PC(ADSL)
PC(Cable)
, ∀S ⊆ C
We can therefore put these two alternatives in a nest.
In the following we will decompose a (two-level) NLM into two Logit
models, because resulting expression is easily interpretable and allows to
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build up intuition for NLMs. Once we have divided the alternatives of the
choice set C into nests - we will dissect the decision process essentially in
two separate decisions - the resulting NLM can be regarded as the product
of two Logit models. The choice set N of the ’first’ decision contains the
created nests N = {N1, ..., NJ}. The choice set of the ’second’ decision are
the alternatives cj1 , ..., cjn within one nest Nj. Note that the two parts of the
decision process - even if they are going to be illustrated in a tree structure
- do not happen sequentially. They are essentially one decision.
If Vc is split into two parts Vc = WNj + Yc (additively separable, linear-
in-parameters) where W is the subset of attributes that is constant for all
alternatives within a nest and Y varies over alternatives in a nest, then
for this specification the probabilities can be written as the product of two
standard Logit probabilities.
Pa = Pa|NjPNj with a ∈ Nj (12)
Where Pa|Nj is the conditional probability that alternative a is chosen, given
that an agent has chosen the nest Nj and PNj is the probability that an
alternative in nest Nj is chosen. Suppose our choice set consisted of four al-
ternatives C = {ADSL, Cable, Mobile, Narrowband, NoInternet}. We could
group them into two different subsets NBroadband and NNoBroadband. Then
the choice probability for cable is equal to the probability that broadband is
chosen times the probability that cable is chosen given NBroadband is chosen.
PNj =
eWNj+λNj INj∑
Nl∈N e
WNl+λNlINl
(13)
Pa|Nj =
eYa/λNj∑
c∈Nj e
Yc/λNj
(14)
INj = ln
∑
c∈Nj
eYc/λNj (15)
Equation (15) defines the inclusive value of the corresponding nest. Its func-
tion is to link the ’upper’ model with the ’lower’ model. Since the agent does
not directly derive any utility from choosing a nest, the inclusive value takes
over this function. INj can be interpretated as the expected utility that an
agent receives from choosing between the alternatives of nest Nj ∈ N .
(13), (14), and (15) put together, yield the choice probability of the Nested
Logit model.
Pa =
eVa/λNj (
∑
c∈Nj e
Vc/λNj )λNj−1∑
Nl∈N (
∑
c∈Nl e
Vc/λNl )λNl−1
(16)
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The values of λNj can vary over nests reflecting different levels of indepen-
dence between nests and therefore different levels of correlation between un-
observed attributes. One can easily see that a value of λNj = 1 for all nests
Nj renders the standard Multinomial Logit model (8). This highlightes that
the NLM is actually a generalization of the Logit model. This can also be
seen regarding the distribution function. The NLM is obtained under the as-
sumption that the vector of unobserved utility  = (1, ..., m), has cumulative
distribution
F () = exp
(
−
∑
Nj
(∑
c∈Nj
e−c/λj
)λj)
Again, a value of λj = 1,∀Nj renders the distribution function where s are
idependent and with a univariate extreme value distribution, rendering the
Logit model. Testing whether λj = 1, ∀Nj ∈ N is equivalent to performing
the Hausman Test for each nest. λj can be interpretated as a measure of
the degree of independence in unobserved utility among alternatives in nest
j. A value λj = 1 incicates that alternatives within nest j are completely
independent, and therefore uncorrelated. Consequently, if the alternatives in
all nests are completely independent, then the IIA condition holds and the
Nested Logit model reduces to the standard Logit model.
Pa = exp
− ∑
Nj∈N
∑
c∈NJ
e−a
 = ∏
c 6=a
e−e
−a
For a derivation of the choice probabilities fromG =
∑
Nj∈N
(∑
c∈Nj (e
Vc)1/λj
)λj
and showing that this model in a member of the GEV family please see Ap-
pendix (.4).
There are many different specifications of Nested Logit models. The differ-
ence ”lies in the explicit scaling of the deterministic utility component ...”(7)
The NLM version presented in this work is also referred to as the 2-Level
Utility Maximization Nested Logit Model (RU2 UMNL). For the same iden-
tification problems mentioned earlier, one of the scale parameters needs to
be normalized, which is normally achieved by seeting any scale parameter to
1. A normalization of a scale parameter of the ’upper’ model will lead to
the RU2 UMNL, whereas a normalization on the ’lower’ level will induce a
RU1 UMNL. No normalization at all will induce the non-normalized Nested
Logit model (NNNL). However, only the RU2 UMNL is consistent with util-
ity maximisation behaviour without any further restrictions7. This can be
formally defined as follows
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Definition 1 (Consistency with Random Utility Theory) Consistency
with utility maximization theory implies, that each alternative’s choice prob-
ability Pa must not change when a constant term δ is added to each alterna-
tive’s deterministic utility component Va.
P˜c(V˜1, ..., V˜J) = Pc(V1, ..., VJ) ∀c ∈ C (17)
where
V˜c := Vc + δ ∀c ∈ C (18)
The proof that the RU2 UMNL satisfies this condition will be given in Ap-
pendix (.5).
3.7.2 3-Level Nested Logit Models
If the correlation structure of the s is more complicated than to be readi-
bly captured with a two level nest structure the NLM can be extended to
encorporate any level of nests. This allows more complex substitution pat-
terns. A NLM is said to have two levels if it consists of one level of marginal
probabilities (’upper level’) and one level of conditional probabilities (’lower
level’). In some situations two level NLMs seem to be inapropriate. A three
level NLM is obtained when every nest Nj ∈ N is divided into subnests
Mk ⊆ Nj with
⋃
kMk = Nj and Mk ∩Ml = ∅, ∀k 6= l from which the agent
then chooses an alternative. It can therefore be illustrated as a sequence of
three decisions.
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Table 3: 3 Level Nested Logit Model
N2
M4
HG
M3
FE
N1
M2
DC
M1
BA
Since we will apply a three level Nested Logit specification to our ex-
ample of internet goods, the three level Nested Logit model will quickly be
presented. The idea behind the structure of the model is equivalent to the
two-level NLM enriched by one level of decisionmaking. In a three level
specification the probability that alternative a is chosen is given by
Pa = Pa|Mk|NjPMk|NjPNj (19)
where Pa|Mk|Nj is the conditional probability that alternative a is chosen,
given subnest Mk was chosen given nest Nj was chosen. Since I am going to
use three level Nested Logit models, I will just list the required probabilities
and inclusive values. They are simply an extension of the two-level case.

Pa|Mk|Nj =
exp(Va,Mk,Nj/λMk,Nj)∑
c∈Mk exp(Vc,Mk,Nj/λMk,Nj)

PMk|Nj =
exp(VMk,Nj/λNj + λMk,NjIMk,Nj/λNj)∑
Ml∈Nj exp(VMl,Nj/λMl,Nj + λMl,NjIMl,Nj/λNj)

IMk,Nj = ln
∑
c∈Mk
exp(Vc,Mk,Nj/λMk,Nj)

PNj =
exp(VNj + λNjINj)∑
Nk∈N exp(VNk + λNkINk)

INj = ln
∑
Mk∈Nj
exp(VMk,Nj/λNj + λMk,NjIMk,Nj/λNj)
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4 Data Description and Sampling Methods
This chapter will briefly introduce the data used in my estimations and ad-
dress a number of sampling issues.
4.1 The Austrian Market for Residential Internet Ac-
cess
On the Austrian market for internet access there are four different types of
connection technologies:
 Cable is delivered over upgraded cable TV networks.
 DSL (Digital Subscriber Line) is a family of technologies that provide
digital data transmission with high frequencies over the wires of a local
telephone network.
 Mobile broadband describe various types of wireless high-speed internet
access via UMTS/HSDPA.
 Narrowband (NB) stands for different types of ISDN and DialUp con-
nections also using telephone lines.
When the survey was conducted more than one million out of 1.36 million
broadband connections were held by residential customers. Firms were not
included in the sample since they arguably are not part of the same market.
Internet connections for companies fall under completely different pricing
tariffs. By the end of 2006, 52% of all households in Austria had an internet
connection with numbers growing fast and steadily. Narrowband connec-
tions still accounted for 19% of the market, however broadband connections
- DSL, Cable, and Mobile - were on the rise. Mobile internet is the newest
technology. The UMTS standard was introduced in 2003, the HSDPA stan-
dard only became available in 2006. The number of mobile internet users was
about 220,000 - a small but fast growing share. However, internet connection
availability is not spread evenly. Whereas more than 90% of households in
Austria have DSL coverage, cable and mobile broadband tends to only be
available in more densely populated regions. The cable network coverage is
about 50%. HSDPA net coverage is usually given in cities with more than
5000 inhabitants. Narrowband internet - running over telephone lines - is
available in 100% of households given that the survey was conducted using
the telephone. I will therefore have to distinguish geographically according
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to the availability of internet access options when performing the estima-
tions. Different choice sets will lead to different decisions. Since there was
no detailed information regarding the availability of mobile internet for the
sake of estimation we will assume that mobile internet is at least available
in regions where cable internet is available. We will therefore distinguish be-
tween regions with the full choice set (Area 1) and regions where only DSL
and Narrowband are available (Area 2). More detailed statistics on market
shares can be found in chapter 6 in table (4.3).
4.2 Data Source
The liberalizing of the telecom sector in Europe began with a with a Green
paper by the European Commission in 1987. Consequently, in the follow-
ing years more and more of the predominantly state-run companies were
privatized. However, the process of liberalization was accompanied by new
regulatory duties and instruments. The EU directives were enacted in 2002
followed by the implementation into Austrian national law in 2003. The Eu-
ropean Commission has enacted that national regulation authorities closely
monitor these markets and has created a three-stage market analysis pro-
cess, including the points (1) market definition, which is supposed to provide
a framework for a (2) market analysis, which should determine whether effec-
tive competition prevails and should identify the companies with significant
market share, and finally, if necessary, (3) impose regulatory instruments.
This was laid down in the Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for
electronic communications networks and services.
The data stems from a survey commissioned by the RTR (the Austrian
National Regulatory Authority) conducted in November 2006. This survey
was conducted for the biannual market analysis required by the European
Commission. Professor B. Yurtoglu, Department of Economics, University
of Vienna, participated in the creation of this study by acting as an advisor
to the Regulatory Authority. This work resulted in the paper ”Demand Esti-
mation and market definietion for broadband internet services” by Cardona,
Schwarz, Yurtoglu and Zulehner. (8). Ida and Kuroda (9) published a simi-
lar study for Japan. At this point I would like to thank Professor Yurtoglu
for his advice and support and hours of discussion.
In the original survey more than 4000 households were interviewed over
the telephone. The data set includes the most important product specific in-
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formation such as the chosen type of internet connection, speed and download
limits, monthly expenses, and the availability of different internet connections
in the respective area. It also included a set of individual specific observa-
tions such as age, household size, highest level of education etc. These socio-
economic variables incorporate consumer heterogeneity and stand as proxies
for taste variations. Since the answers of such surveys are not always reliable
additional price, volume and download limit information was obtained from
the websites of the internet service providers. Information on internet access
availability according to postal code was also obtained. The responses given
on the telephone interview were then compared to the official information.
Observations were deleted if either the answers concerning the availability of
certain internet connections did not match our information about the avail-
ability in the households respective area received from the operator, or if the
answer about the price of an internet connection differed substantially from
information collected on the ISP’s internet website. The underlying argu-
ment for this data selection process is that a consumer’s choice based on too
little or wrong information cannot be fully rational and should therefore not
be used for any estimations.
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Table (4.2) provides an overview over the explanatory variables used in
the models to come:
Table 4: Explanatory Variables
Var Description
Survey Data
choice Type of internet access in the household (HH)
area Area code of the household
sex Head of the household is male/female
nb usr Number of people using the internet
nb pc Number of PCs in the HH
nb lt Number of laptops in the HH
nb hh Number of people living in the HH
age Age of the head of the HH
income Income of the head of the HH
Highest level of education:
edu com Compulsory schooling
edu hsno High School without graduation
edu hsyes High School with graduation
edu uni University degree
price Price per month as stated in the interview
volume Monthly included data volume
speed1 Maximal download speed
d flat Flat rate dummy
dsl av i DSL availability according to interview
cab av i Cable availability according to interview
mob av i Mobile internet availability according to interview
Other Sources
price2 Monthly price according to the operator
speed2 Maximal download speed according to the operator
dsl av ac DSL availability according to area code
cab av ac Cable availability according to area code
mob av ac Mobile internet availability according to area code
4.3 Descriptive Statistics
In order to give the reader some feeling for the data set I have included some
descriptive statistics - both product specific as well as individual specific
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- in tables (4.3) and (4.3). The household specific variables include age,
household size, income, sex, and the highest level of education.
Table 5: Household Specific Statistics
DSL Cable Mobile Narrowb. No Int.
Mean age (head of household) 45.5 43.9 41.2 46.8 61.6
Mean household size 3.0 2.8 2.8 3.0 2.0
Mean income (head of household) 2566 2524 2147 2570 1507
Gender: female 46.8% 47.8% 43.7% 48.9% 66.4%
Education:
Compulsory school 35.1% 31.6% 37.5% 31.4% 72.3%
High school without graduation 23.1% 14.9% 22.9% 24.0% 15.7%
High school with graduation 25.4% 30.7% 29.2% 29.7% 9.2%
University degree 16.3% 22.8% 10.4% 14.9% 2.8%
The product specific variables include price, download speed, and down-
load volume included in the monthly fixed price for non-flat-rate products.
While no flatrate products exist for mobile and narrowband connections the
percentage of DSL and cable users with a flat rate tariff is 9.9% and 53.2%
respectively.
Table 6: Product Specific Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Price per month (e)
DSL 32.02 10.50 9.9 85
Cable 39.38 14.41 10 94.9
Mobile 37.12 16.52 9.5 99
Narrowband 20.44 14.11 4 60
Download speed (kbit/s)
DSL 1,345 1,040 0,248 6,144
Cable 2,938 2,511 0,128 16,384
Mobile 900 0 900 900
Narrowband 56 0 56 56
Download volume included (MB) (non flat-rate)
DSL 1973 3706 250 30000
Cable 5109 8466 100 30000
Mobile 952 961 250 4000
Narrowband 0 0 0 0
Surveys tend to be very expensive. Research budgets therefore constitute
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one of the greatest constraints to the size of a sample. In smaller samples
one can often observe that the distribution of the alternatives in the sample
differs significantly from the known distribution of alternatives in the overall
population. This is problematic since a bias in the sample will be transmit-
ted to the parameter estimates. A correction of the distribution by simply
weighing the observations will do the trick. In our sample users of DSL were
clearly overrepresented. Therefore I corrected for this bias by weighting my
observations in order to match the distribution of Statistik Austria 2006. Ta-
ble 4.3 depicts the market shares of different kinds of internet connections as
well as the distribution in my sample. ’Sample weighted’ lists the corrected
distribution used in my estimations.
Table 7: Observations
DSL Cable Mobile Narrowb. No Int. Total
Maket Share 13.45% 9.97% 1.22% 16.21% 59.16% 100%
Sample unweighted 553 228 48 176 1007 2012
Sample Share 27.49 % 11.33% 2.39% 8.75% 50.05% 100%
Sample weighted 271 201 25 326 1189 2012
All connections region 27.55 % 17.59% 2.49% 7.47% 44.90%
Area One:
Vienna 21.77% 21.77% 1.64% 5.34% 49.49%
Rest of Austria 31.27% 14.91% 3.03% 5.34% 41.95%
Area Two 31.70% - 1.53% 11.49% 55.28%
I have differentiated between Vienna and the rest of Austria due to the
fact that the capital has a significantly higher coverage and therefore a much
higher market share of cable internet. This will be considered in the estima-
tions to come. Only an insignificant number of people had more than one
internet access. Most of them combined mobile internet with an other form
of access. However, this number was so small that I decided not to create
an own category. Another way to deal with the problem of alternatives with
too small shares in the sample is choice-based sampling.
4.4 Suggestions for the Sampling Method
Whenever one alternative from the choice set is very rare, this will also man-
ifest in the sample. The quality of the estimation will suffer from this lack of
a reasonable number of observations. A common method to fix this problem
is to deliberately skew the sampling process in favour of the underrepresented
alternative. The survey actively includes more agents who have chosen the
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certain alternative in order to obtain a more balanced sample than random
sampling would produce. The oversampling of one alternative necessarily
creates a biased mix of observed decisions, which will have to be corrected
by weighing the alternatives respectively. Manski and Lermann (1977) have
derived the WESML - the weighted endogenous sampling maximum likeli-
hood estimator - for situations like these. One necessary requirement is that
the true population distribution of alternatives is known.
If the researcher is using a purely choice-based sample and in-
cludes an alternative-specific constant in the representative util-
ity for each alternative, then estimating a Logit model as if the
sample were exogenous produces consistent estimates for all the
model parameters except the alternative specific constants. Fur-
thermore, these constants are biased by a known factor and can
therefore be adjusted so that the adjusted constants are consistent
3
If we are particularly interested in knowing whether mobile internet - a new
and therefore not widespread technology - is a close substitute of ADSL or
Cable a random sample would have to be very large in order to assure a
reasonable number of households with mobile internet.
Another important sampling issue is the question whether to use trans-
action or holding data. The internet market is characterising by ongoing
strong technological progress. The mass use of the internet is a recent devel-
opment and still today constantly new applications are created and perfected
and technology improved. It can therefore hardly be considered a market in
equilibrium. Bearing in mind that people always lag behind technological
progress - it involves time and costs to adapt and inform - one has to raise
the question whether the market shares are the outcome of sound decision
making at any point in time. The ’captive consumer’ does not react even to
a strong increase in price because he either doesn’t care or is not sufficiently
informed. Therefore I would suggest a transactions rather than a holdings
approach. This means that only households who have either changed their
internet connection or who got their first internet connection in a period of
time should be included in the sample. Arguably, a transaction approach
more closely reflects the decision making at a specific point in time since
these households have actually expressed, through their choices, preferences
for a specific product.
3Kenneth Choice (2003)
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The third and final point that I would like to criticize regards the set of
chosen explanatory variables obtained from the telephone survey. In order to
capture consumer heterogeneity or taste variation, socio-economic data was
collected from every interviewed person. To name just a few: age, income,
size of the household, number of PCs in the household,... These entities
should serve as proxies for the strongly varying profile of internet use. But
why were the households not asked directly about the way they use their
internet access? Questions such as: What are the main applications of the
internet connection in your household? Is there an online gamer in your
household? How many hours do you use your internet connection on average
per week? Do you download music or film from the internet?
The answers to those questions would have shed a lot more light on con-
sumption profiles. They have arguably more explanatory power as far as
taste variation is concerned. An internet user whose only application is on-
line banking is likely to be more price elastic than a online gaming afficionado.
Whereas the online banker can go to a real bank there is no close substitute
for the online gamer. Therefore, an additional differentiation according to
internet consumption profile would have made more sense. The quality with
which we can explain consumer heterogeneity will have a great influence on
our estimation results.
4.5 Estimating the Parameters of the Non-chosen Al-
ternatives
Since we can only observe the attributes of the chosen alternative an obvious
question is: What proxies should be used for the attributes of non-chosen
alternatives? For the application of discrete choice models it is necessary to
allocate price and other characteristics of internet connections to non-chosen
options. There is, however, no standard methodology to obtain these figures.
The researcher is left with his intuition. Since prices, volumes and speeds
offered by the large number of different ISPs were far from uniform, one
of the most delicate tasks in the process of this allocation was to identify
an appropriate average for price, volume and speed for every group. The
approaches are explained briefly by type of internet access in the following
sections.
4.5.1 Narrowband
The allocation of narrowband prices to households that currently do not have
internet access, or a broadband connection is tricky. The individual spe-
cific variables that were most significant in explaining narrowband expenses
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were region and age. Therefore four geographical groups were formed, within
which two age subgroups were created, differentiating between those younger
and older than fifty. The group price averages were then allocated to all its
members. Speed and included volume does not vary for narrowband house-
holds. Therefore 56 kbit/s maximum speed and zero included megabytes
were assigned.
4.5.2 Cable
There are many cable operators in Austria, however the packages they of-
fer are similar in terms of bandwidth and included volume. Therefore the
”low”, ”medium” and ”high” usage packages of the seven biggest cable ISPs
were collected and allocated to DSL, NB, Mobile, and NoInternet house-
holds in the following manner: Households without internet and narrowband
households that spend on average less than 25 were assigned the ”low” usage
package. Narrowband households that spent more than 25 were assigned the
’medium’ usage package, DSL households were assigned the package closest
in bandwidth and mobile households the package closest in price.
4.5.3 DSL
DSL price, speed and volume data was allocated in the following manner: The
tariffs of the three largest DSL operators were collected from their websites.
In areas with more than one active operator price average was calculated
weighted by market share. No internet and narrowband households were
assigned the ”low” user package, cable users were assigned the package closest
to their own in terms of price, speed and volume. Mobile users were assigned
the package closest in price.
4.5.4 Mobile
The price and volume for mobile internet was allocated according to the
monthly amount paid by the household for their current internet access.
Weighted price averages of the four big mobile operators were used. The
download speed was assumed to be fix and 900kbit/s.
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5 Selecting the Appropriate Discrete Choice
Model
Even within the family of Logit models there are endless possibilities to
specify the model. The main distinguishing features in my case are the
choice between estimating joint coefficients or alternative specific coefficients
and the choice of subdividing the choice set into nests. As far as the first
question is concerned, the first approach was to estimate a price coefficient βc
for every alternative. This would allow us to calculate cross-price elasticities
between all pairs of alternatives in the choice set, delivering 25 different
elasticities for area one. However our data set lacked the explanatory power
for so many estimated coefficients. Therefore I estimated a joint coefficient
β for all alternatives in area one.
βc = β ∀c ∈ C
This limits the number of estimable coefficients to one own-price and one
cross-price elasticity for every alternative, delivering a number of ten alto-
gether. As a result the interpretation of β also has to be altered. The joint
price coefficient β has to be interpreted as the average value of price in terms
of utility.
In area two, where only DSL and NB are available, the estimation of one
parameter per alternative was feasible. The most promising method to obtain
possible settings for Nested Logit models is to simply look at the data in the
following manner. Tabulate the alternative in the choice set distinguishing
between regions where single alternatives are not available. This (completely
made up) table depicts this kind of illustration.
Table 8: Market shares according to availability
Alternative AllConnections NoCable NoDSL NoNarrowb. NoMobile
Cable 30% - 60% (+100%) 36.6% (+25%) 34.3% (+14.3%)
DSL 40% 60% (+50 %) - 50% (+25%) 45.7% (+14.3%)
NB 20 % 20% (+0%) 25% (+25%) - 20% (+0%)
Mobile 10% 20% (+100%) 15% (+50%) 13.3% (+33.3%) -
Under the assumption that consumer tastes are homogenously distributed
over all regions one can draw certain conclusions. Bear in mind that two
alternatives in the same nest have to satisfy the IIA assumption. This means
that no matter what alternative is missing, the substitution pattern of two
alternatives in the same nest has to be reasonably similar. As one can see this
is the case for DSL and Cable and is clearly not the case for NB and Mobile.
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The conclusion one could draw from this result is that DSL and Cable belong
to the same nest and NB and Mobile do not. Unfortunately, our data does
not allow this kind of analysis. Firstly there is no region is Austria where
NB is not available since all it requires is telephone lines. Also information
on the availability of mobile internet was not accessible at the time of the
collection of the data. Secondly there seem to be strong differences in terms
of socio-demographic qualities. E.g. in urban areas the rate of academics is
far higher than in the hinterland. The assumption that tastes do not vary
with the regions is therefore at least questionable.
5.1 Area 1
Since the bespoken method is only partially appropriate in our case the
researcher has to rely largely on his intuition. Since the researcher is very
likely to have an internet connection himself he can try to analyse his own
decision process. One possible model of a decision making process is the
following: Arguably the first decision would be whether to make a purchase
or not. All other considerations are secondary. Once I have decided to make
a purchase the next question would be whether to get broadband internet or
not. A decision making process of this type can be illustrated in the following
way:
Table 9: Area 1: 3-Level Nested Logit Model Type A
Internet
Broadband
MobileDSLCable
Narrowband
NoInternet
There are, however, a number of different and also plausible structures
to model this process. In the process of finding the model that fits the data
best I have tried the following:
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A Conditional Logit model.
Table 10: Area 1: Multinomial Logit Model
MobileDSLCableNarrowbandNoInternet
A two-level Nested Logit model with two nests. The only distinctive
criteria is internet or not.
Table 11: Area 1: 2-Level Nested Logit Model
Internet
MobileDSLCableNarrowband
NoInternet
Table 12: Area 1: 3-Level Nested Logit Model Type B
Internet
NotMobile
NarrowbandDSLCable
Mobile
NoInternet
5.2 Area 2
The limited choice set of this area (C = (DSL,NB,NI)) affected the mod-
elling decision in two ways: Firstly I decided to estimate a separate price
coefficient for both DSL and NB. Secondly the number of possible settings
for discrete choice models was dramatically reduced. I have tried both a
Conditional Logit model and a 2-level Nested Logit model.
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Table 13: Area 2: Conditional Logit Model
DSLNarrowbandNoInternet
Table 14: Area 2: 2-Level Nested Logit Model
Internet
DSLNarrowband
NoInternet
5.3 Comparing Models - Goodness of Fit
Model comparison was undertaken by means of three indicators. Sign con-
ditions of variables, their statistical significance (t-values), and degrees of
fitness such as the McFadden R2 or Akaike’s Information Criterion. Sign
conditions are a very strong method for model selection. Coefficients with
signs that do not match our expectations based on economic theory e.g. a
positive coefficient for the price of an alternative are an excellent indicator
that the model doesn’t properly fit the data. A statistic that describes how
well the model fits the data is the likelihood ratio index also referred to as
the McFadden R2. It can be used for every discrete choice model since it is
based on the log-likelihood function which is the estimation method for all
discrete choice models and is defined as
ρ2 = 1− LL(βˆ)
LL(0)
where LL(βˆ) is the value of the likelihood function at the estimated param-
eters and LL(0) is its value when all parameters are zero, indicating that
our variables have no explanatory power at all. One can easily see that this
statistic is confined to [0, 1]. Its value is 0 when our model does not do any
better than the zero parameter model and 1 if our model can perfectly explain
the decisions of the agents. Note that this statistic cannot be interpreted in
the same fashion as the R2 in linear regression models, which indicates the
percentage of the variation in the dependent variable which can be explained
by the model. It can, however, be used to compare different models with
respect to goodness of fit as long as the two models were estimated using a)
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the same data and using b) the same set of alternatives. If this is not the
case the likelihood function cannot be used to compare models.
5.4 Results: Area 1
In my first attempt I tried to estimate price coefficients for all five alterna-
tives rendering a total of 25 elasticities. This did not prove successful since
this caused insurmountable computational difficulties. Either the software
program in use was not able to solve the resulting maximum likelihood es-
timation or the results were miles from expected values. In order to reduce
the number of demand parameters I had to put some structure on my de-
mand function. Therefore I chose to estimate one joint price coefficient for
all alternatives. This delivered the following results:
The Conditional Logit model (5.1) seemed not to capture our data correctly.
Not only were sign coefficients problematic (App.7) - e.g. the price coeffi-
cient was positive - but also the Hausman test - testing whether coefficients
were stable when one alternative is dropped - clearly rejects the assumption
of IIA. This result is very robust since when I dropped the alternatives one
by one the χ2 test value never dropped below 46.78. Not surprisingly, the
fitness of this model had to be rejected.
In order to gain a feeling for how robust my estimation results were I cal-
culated the elasticities for all the aforementioned models and variations of
them and compared them. The results were not very stable. Elasticities var-
ied by +/ − 0.3 in the most cases. One in five models delivered completely
altered results such as different signs. While the absolute values of the co-
efficients varied to some extent, the differences between the coefficients were
surprisingly robust. In almost all models the elasticity for mobile internet
was significantly smaller than the elasticity for DSL and Cable. Also the
elasticities for immobile broadband connections never differed much.
The model that delivered the most promising results was the three level
Nested Logit model where the distinguishing criteria in the second level was
broadband or not. (3.7.2) The estimation results are depicted in table
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Table 15: Area 1: Nested Logit Regression
Var Coef. Std. Err. z P > |z|
3rd level:
price2 -0.0428 0.0057 -7.49 0.000
volume 0.0131 0.0032 4.06 0.000
speed 0.5605 0.0588 9.53 0.000
dummy cable 0.4890 0.1911 2.56 0.011
dummy dsl 0.9877 0.1706 5.79 0.000
2nd level: broadband vs. narrowband
age*bb -0.0300 0.0044 -6.88 0.000
edu com*bb -0.6043 0.2295 -2.63 0.008
edu hsno*bb -0.5393 0.2501 -2.16 0.031
edu hsyes*bb -1.1289 0.2187 -5.16 0.000
1st level: internet vs. no internet
edu com*i -2.0857 0.5869 -3.55 0.000
edu hsno*i -1.1598 0.5961 -1.95 0.052
edu hsyes*i -0.2283 0.5254 -0.43 0.664
nb hh*i 0.4271 0.0709 6.02 0.000
inclusive values:
broadband 1.2810 0.1950 6.57 0.000
internet 3.7027 0.5677 6.52 0.000
Where * indicates that the variable was interacted with a dummy vari-
able - bb indicates the broadband dummy, i indicates the internet dummy.
The price coefficient has the expected negative sign and volume and speed
the expected positive sign. The negative sign for the education dummies for
high school graduates seems a little bit surprising. This would indicate that
a higher education reduces the probability of having internet at home.
The derivation of the elasticity formulas from the Logit and Nested Logit
formulas can be found in Appendix .6. The only additional formula necessary
for the calculation of the elasticities is:
∂Ya
∂xa
= βˆa(1− share of a)
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The resulting elasticities were:
Table 16: Area One: Elasticities
Alternative Cross Price Elasticity Own Price Elasticity
Cable 0.9891 -0.9077
DSL 0.6320 -0.6623
NB 1.6398 -0.3246
Mobile 0.2515 -1.1653
Economic theory would prompt us that the magnitude of these elasticities
are too low. One would expect them to be higher than in regions with
a limited choice set. This is, however, not the case. The differences in
elasticity seem to make good sense. The NB own-price elasticity is very
low. Since this is the cheapest form of internet access, people that really
depend on the internet will be prepared to pay even higher prices. The
own-price elasticities of all other alternatives are higher. Consumers have
the possibility to downgrade their broadband connection to a narrowband
connection if prices are increased. Even though the mobile internet users
in the sample were only few, the result seems to be in accordance to our
intuition. The own-price elasticity is the highest indicating that consumers
would readably give up the mobility feature if the price was to be increased.
5.5 Results: Area 2
The results from the second area were much more stable. Even though I
had to reject the Conditional Logit model on basis of the Hausman test the
resulting coefficients were very similar to the ones obtained by the 2-level
Nested Logit model. I assume that the smaller number of coefficients to
be estimated makes the model more balanced. I was even able to estimate
separate price coefficients for DSL and NB.
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Table 17: Area 2: Nested Logit Regression
Var Coef. Std. Err. z P > |z|
2nd level:
price2*dsl -0.1045 0.0095 -11.00 0.000
price2*nb -0.0448 0.0062 -7.24 0.000
speed 1.3572 0.1406 9.65 0.000
volume 0.4958 0.1503 3.30 0.001
1st level: internet vs. no internet
age*i -0.0533 0.0090 -5.95 0.000
edu hsno*i -1.3232 0.3677 -3.60 0.000
edu hsyes*i -0.8376 0.4122 -2.03 0.042
nb hh*i 0.3773 0.0899 4.20 0.000
dummy i 4.3144 0.8112 5.32 0.000
inclusive value:
internet 7.7006 1.0599 7.27 0.000
The resulting elasticities were:
Table 18: Area Two: Elasticities
Alternative Own-Price Elasticity Cross-Price Elasticity
DSL -1.5228 0.2284
NB -0.5717 0.6385
These results seem plausible. Even though there is no other broadband
connection available in these regions the own-price elasticity of DSL is high
indicating that consumers readily switch to NB, or even NoInternet. The
own-price elasticity of NB is smaller suggesting that people depend on their
internet connection and are ready to pay even higher prices. Cross-price
elasticities more or less tell the same story.
6 Conclusio
The starting point of my thesis was a simple two-stage least squares estima-
tion which could provide price and income elasticities for the average broad-
band product in Europe. Its simplicity relied mainly on the assumption of
homogenous goods and homogenous consumers. It cannot differentiate be-
tween different forms of internet access or different broadband packages. It
also fails to capture differences in the taste of consumers. Whereas these
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assumptions keeps the model simple and the data used readably available,
the conclusions that can be drawn from it are very limited. Therefore models
for differentiated products were developed. They represent a clear general-
ization of the homogenous goods market. However, this generalization and
power comes with a number of disadvantages. In order to obtain demand
elasticities for an n goods market one has to estimate n2 parameters. The
sheer number of parameters makes estimation difficult. To solve this prob-
lem economist have come up with the idea to base the demand function on
individual demand, which can be obtained from a model of discrete choice.
This approach created a very rich but also more complicated model. Models
of this type circumvent the problem of price endogeneity by the (reasonable)
assumption that a single consumer does not have any price setting power.
This, however, comes with the disadvantage that it completely neglects sup-
ply side and market equilibrium considerations.
From a structural perspective the neoclassical model has very little structure.
Only the choice of the set of variables included in the models stems from
economic theory. The Discrete Choice model is highly structured. There an
underlying behavioural model and a number of structural assumption for ex-
ample abouththe distribution of the error terms. In Discrete Choice models
both prices and unobserved product characteristics enter demand equations
in a nonlinear fashion.
Discrete Choice models have become very popular because they have the
following great strengths: They allow for a high degree of product differenti-
ation and account for consumer heterogeneity by using socio-economic data
standing as proxies for variations in taste. However, this comes at the cost of
having to conduct a consumer survey. Industry or country level data tends
to be more readably available.
The power of these two features can best be illustrated by giving some
examples of possible research questions which would call for a discrete choice
approach. Suppose you are a company and would like to introduce a new
internet connection package. A most obvious question would concern the
potential demand for this particular product given its product characteris-
tics. One powerful feature is that the discrete choice model can estimate
the potential demand for new products, especially one that are dissimilar
to goods already on the market. It delivers a quantifiable measure of how
much customers value certain characteristics of a good. It allows us to eas-
ily move between statements about aggregate demand and statements about
consumer utility. Hence, it has the power to predict how the willingness
to pay will increase when the bandwidth of the product is increased. Sup-
pose you are a competition authority. This model can deliver estimates of
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demand elasticities between any two goods. It can therefore be used for a
market definition, an important part in any market analysis. It can indicate,
whether the market lacks competition or not. It can also predict changes in
the structure of demand as a result of socio-demographic shifts in the popu-
lation. How will a change in the sociodemographic structure of the country
effect demand of high speed internet goods?
Another important result was the observation that with an increasing
number of parameters to estimate the results became less and less robust.
It would be very interesting to analyse in what way the robustness depends
on the number of goods in the choice set, which determines the number of
parameters to be estimated.
In this work I could observe the following: In regions where only two internet
connections were offered the model delivered more reliable results. In those
regions where all four connection types were available I had to restrict the
number of price elasticities to make the model feasible at all. Either the
results were completely off track or the software failed to compute the results.
Even after the restriction the results turns out to be rather instable. Small
differences in the specification of the model, such as adding one or more
explanatory variables, sometimes completely alters the outcome.
One downside of structured models is that they are based on a series
of maintained and therefore non-testable assumptions. This blurs the trou-
bleshooting phase of research. If your estimation results are completely off
the track there is no real way to find out where the problem lies or what
assumption was not met.
6.1 Limitations of Discrete Choice Models
One very important limitation to the model is that it is static. It cannot in-
corporate switching costs between different internet connection types. Even
though installation fees and set-up fees are free of charge for most broadband
products other forms of switching costs could be significant. A model that
can capture switching behaviour between different alternatives will likely de-
liver more reliable predictions.
Another important limitation to this demand structure, which is caused by
the very nature of discrete choice models, is that these models rule out choos-
ing several alternatives. This does not appear too limiting in the case of in-
ternet products - people very rarely have more than one internet connection.
This could, however, pose a serious problem, when modelling car purchases.
We have seen, that this problem can sometimes be solved elegantly by in-
cluding multiple good alternatives to the choice set. This trick is not always
possible. Further, the number of alternatives in the choice set should not
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be too large in order to produce a computationally feasible model given a
certain sample size.
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7 Appendix
.1 Derivation of the Logit Probabilities
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.2 Derivation of Logit Elasticities
In this section we will derive both own elasticities and cross elasticities from
logit choice probabilities. Elasticities basically answer the question: To what
extent do probabilities change as a result of a change in an observed attribute
(e.g. how much will demand for ADSL increase when the price is reduced,
or the bandwidth increased?).
Own elasticity (Ea,a): The change in probability that agent i picks alternative
a given a change in the price xa of alternative a can be calculated:
∂Pa
∂xa
=
∂(eVa/
∑
c∈C e
V
c )
∂xa
=
eVa∑
c∈C e
Vc
∂Va
∂xa
− e
Va
(
∑
c∈C e
Vc)2
eVa
∂Va
∂xa
=
∂Va
∂xa
(Pa − P 2a )
=
∂Va
∂xa
Pa(1− Pa)
= βxPa(1− Pa) ”if Va is linear in coefficients”
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Therefore the own price elasticity Ea,a takes the form:
Ea,a = ∂Pa
∂xa
xa
Pa
=
∂Va
∂xa
Pa(1− Pa)xa
Pa
=
∂Va
∂xa
xa(1− Pa)
= βxxa(1− Pa ”if Va is linear in coefficients”
Cross price elasticity (Ea,b): The change in probability that agent i picks
alternative a given a change in the observable attributes of alternative b can
be calculated:
∂Pi,a
∂xb
=
∂(eVa/
∑
c∈C e
V
c )
∂xb
= − e
Va
(
∑
c∈C e
Vc)2
eVb
∂Va
∂xb
= −∂Va
∂xb
PaPb
= xbPaPb ”if Va is linear in coefficients”
Cross elasticities will look like:
Ea,b = ∂Pa
∂xb
xb
Pa
= −∂Va
∂xb
xbPb
= −βxxbPb ”if Va is linear in coefficients”
.3 Proof: Logit Model is a Member of the GEV family
Consider G :=
∑
c∈C e
Vc . This function satisfies all properties from (11)
since 1) the sum of positive terms is positive, 2)
∑
c∈C ρe
Vc = ρ
∑
c∈C e
Vc 3)
eVc → ∞ ⇒ C → ∞ and finally 4) ∂G∂eVc = 1 ∀c ∈ C and
∂kG
∂e
Vi1 ,...,∂e
Vik
=
0 ∀k ≥ 1. By simply inserting the defined function in (11) we obtain:
Pa =
eVaGc
G
=
eVc∑
c∈CeVc
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.4 Derivation of the Choice Probabilities of the Nested
Logit Model
Starting point is the function G =
∑
Nj∈N
(∑
c∈Nj (e
Vc)1/λj
)λj
. First we
will show that this function satisfies the four necessary qualities of the GEV
family. G is clearly nonnegative since it consists of a sum of nonnegative
ex terms. G is homogenous of degree 1 since
∑
Nj∈N
(∑
c∈Nj(ρx)
1/λj
)λj
=
ρ
∑
Nj∈N
(∑
c∈Nj x
1/λj
)λj
. G also satisfies eVi,c →∞⇒ G→∞ ∀c ∈ C.
The first derivative with respect to a
∂G
∂eVi,a
=
(∑
c∈Nj
(eVi,c)1/λj
)λj−1
(eVi,a)1/λj−1 ≥ 0 because eVi,c ≥ 0 ∀c ∈ C
The cross derivation
Ga,b =
λj − 1
λj
(∑
c∈Nj
(eVi,c)1/λj
)λj−2
(eVi,aeVi,b)λj−1 ≤ 0
if λj ∈ [0, 1] and if b ∈ Nj 3 a
and Ga,b = 0 if b /∈ Nj, a ∈ Nj. Higher derivates will alternate in sign due
to the negative exponent of the sum. (without proof). Since all conditions
are satisfied we can simply insert G in (11) whereby we compute the choice
probabilities of the nested logit model.
Pa =
eVaGa
G
=
eVa (eVa )1/λj−1
(∑
c∈Nj (e
Vc )1/λj
)λj−1
∑
Nj∈N
(∑
c∈Nj (e
Vc )1/λj
)λj
=
eVa/λj
(∑
c∈Nj e
Vc/λj
)λj−1
∑
Nj∈N
(∑
c∈Nj e
Vc/λj
)λj
.5 Proof: RU2 UMNL is Consistent with Random Util-
ity Theory
In this section all three components of the NLM probabilities (16) will be re-
calculated after altering the deterministic utility component in the following
manner V˜c := Vc + δ ∀c ∈ C.
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P˜a|Nj =
exp(V˜a/λNj)∑
c∈Nj exp(V˜c/λNj)
=
=
exp((Va + δ)/λNj)∑
c∈Nj exp((Vc + δ)/λNj)
=
=
exp(Va/λNj) exp(δ/λNj)(∑
c∈Nj exp(Vc/λNj)
)
exp(δ/λNj)
=
=
exp(Va/λNj)∑
c∈Nj exp(Vc/λNj)
=
= Pa|Nj
I˜Nj = ln
∑
c∈Nj exp(Y˜c/λNj) =
= ln
((∑
c∈Nj exp(Yc/λNj)
)
exp(δ/λNj)
)
=
= δ
λNj
+ ln
∑
c∈Nj exp(Yc/λNj) =
= δ
λNj
+ INj
P˜Nj =
exp(W˜Nj + λNj I˜Nj)∑
Nl∈N exp(W˜Nl + λNl I˜Nl)
=
exp(WNj + δ + λNj(INj + δ/λNj))∑
Nl∈N exp(WNl + δ + λNl(INl + δ/λNl))
=
exp(2δ) exp(WNj + λNj I˜Nj)
exp(2δ)
∑
Nl∈N exp(WNl + λNlINl)
=
= PNj
.6 Derivation of the Nested Logit model elasticities
In this section we will derive the required elasticities for both the 2-level and
the 3-level nested logit models. Own price elasticity (Ea,a) can be interpreted
as the change in probability an agent picks alternative a given a change in
an attribute i.e. the price xa of alternative a.
In the 2-level case the elasticities are calculated:
Ea,a = ∂Pa
∂xa
xa
Pa
The probability of choice a is
Pa = Pa|NjPNj
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Its derivative with respect to xa is
∂Pa
∂xa
=
∂Pa|Nj
∂xa
PNj +
∂PNj
∂xa
Pa|Nj
The derivatives of (13) and (14) are
∂PNj
∂xa
= PNj(1−PNj)Pa|Nj
∂Ya
∂xa
∂Pa|Nj
∂xa
= Pa|Nj(1−Pa|Nj)
∂Ya
∂xa
1
λNj
Own price elasticity therefore equals
Ea,a = ∂Ya
∂xa
xa
(
(1−PNj) + (1−Pa|Nj)
1
λNj
)
Cross-price elasticity equals
Ea,b = ∂Pa
∂xb
xb
Pa
∂Pa
∂xb
=
∂Pa|Nj
∂xb
PNj +
∂PNj
∂xb
Pa|Nj
∂PNj
∂xb
= PNj(1−PNj)Pb|Nj
∂Ya
∂xb
∂Pa|Nj
∂xb
= Pa|NjPb|Nj
∂Yb
∂xb
1
λNj
Crossprice elasticity therefore equals:
Ea,b = Pb|Njxb
∂Yb
∂xb
(
(1−PNj) +
1
λNj
)
For 3-level nested logit models the elasticities are calculated:
Ea,a = ∂Pa
∂xa
xa
Pa
The probability of choice a is
Pa = Pa|Mk|NjPMk|NjPNj
Its derivative with respect to xa is
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∂Pa
∂xa
=
∂Pa|Mk|Nj
∂xa
PMk|NjPNj + Pa|Mk|Nj
∂PMk|Nj
∂xa
PNj + Pa|Mk|NjPMk|Nj
∂PNj
∂xa
The three derivatives with respect to xa are
∂Pa|Mk|Nj
∂xa
=
∂Va,Mk,Nj
∂xa
1
λMk,Nj
(Pa|Mk|Nj −P2a|Mk|Nj)
∂PMk|Nj
xa
=
∂Va,Mk,Nj
∂xa
1
λNj
Pa|Mk|NjPMk|Nj(1−PMk|Nj)
∂PNj
∂xa
=
∂Va,Mk,Nj
∂xa
Pa|Mk|NjPMk|NjPNj(1−PNj)
Where
∂Va,Mk,Nj
∂xa
equals βx if Vi,a is linear in coefficients. Therefore the own
price elasticity is equal to
Ea,a = ∂Va,Mk,Nj∂xa xa
(
(1−PNj)PMk|NjPa|Mk|Nj+
+(1−PMk|Nj) 1λNj Pa|Mk|Nj + (1−Pa|Mk|Nj)
1
λMk,Nj
)
Cross price elasticity (Ea,b) can be interpreted as the change in probability
an agent picks alternative a given a change in an attribute i.e. the price xb
of alternative b.
Ea,b = ∂Pa
∂xb
xb
Pa
The derivative of the probability Pa = Pa|Mk|NjPMk|NjPNj of alternative a
with respect to the price of alternative b is
∂Pa
∂xb
=
∂Pa|Mk|Nj
∂xb
PMk|NjPNj + Pa|Mk|Nj
∂PMk|Nj
∂xb
PNj + Pa|Mk|NjPMk|Nj
∂PNj
∂xb
The only derivative which is significantly different is
∂Pa|Mk|Nj
∂xb
=
∂Vb,M ′k,N ′j
∂xb
Pa|Mk|NjPb|Mk|Nj
The resulting cross price elasticity is equal to
Ea,b = ∂Va,Mk,Nj∂xb xb
(
(1−PNj)PMk|NjPa|Mk|Nj+
+(1−PMk|Nj) 1λNj Pa|Mk|Nj + Pa|Mk|Nj
)
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.7 Estimation results: Conditional Logit Model
clogit zugangsart preis2 volumen gb downloadrate gb alter sb alter sb
bildung hs sb bildung hsom sb d wien catv d wien dsl if dsl vf plz==1
& catv vf plz==1, group(serial)
Table 19: Conditial Logit Model
Variable Coeff. Std. Error z p > |z|
Price .0379044 .0057103 6.64 0.000
Volume in GB -.00748 .0050109 -1.49 0.136
Speed in MBit/sek. .2989016 .0768916 3.89 0.000
Age*NoInt. .0588009 .0028251 20.81 0.000
Age*Nb .0197845 .003906 5.07 0.000
Edu HS*Nb -1.328497 .3168221 -4.19 0.000
Edu HSwG*NB -.4950805 .3224985 -1.54 0.125
Dummy vienna cable .6083347 .1563382 3.89 0.000
Dummy vienna dsl .6831593 .1530855 4.46 0.000
Log likelihood = -1141.3753, Pseudo R2 = 0.3083
clogit zugangsart preis2 volumen gb downloadrate gb alter sb alter sb
bildung hs sb bildung hsom sb d wien catv d wien dsl if dsl vf plz==1
& catv vf plz==1 & choice!=’’dsl’’, group(serial)
est store partial
suest full partial
test [ full zugangsart = partial zugangsart ], common
Delivered a χ2 of 46.78 which yields Prob > chi2 = 0.0000.
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A Deutsche Zusammenfassung
In dieser Arbeit diskutiere ich Mo¨glichkeiten fu¨r eine Scha¨tzung der Nach-
frage fu¨r Internetzugang in O¨sterreich. Es werden zwei unterschiedliche Mod-
elle, (A) und (B), vorgestellt, die an den entgegengesetzten Enden des Spek-
trums mo¨glicher Modelle stehen. Modell A baut auf einer Reihe stark vere-
infachender Annahmen auf, worunter jedoch die Aussagekraft leidet. Dieses
dient daher in erster Linie als Motiviation fu¨r das viel reichere und aus-
sagekra¨ftigere Modell B. Die Kernannahme, durch die sie sich unterscheiden,
ist, ob die Gu¨ter des betrachteten Marktes homogen sind oder nicht. Diese
Frage kann apriori nicht eindeutig gekla¨rt werden, ist fu¨r die Modellierung
des Marktes jedoch von entscheidenster Bedeutung. Die Annahme homo-
gener Gu¨ter (A) fu¨hrt auf folgendes Gleichungssystem, das sich mit Hilfe
von Instrumental Variable Estimation scha¨tzen la¨sst:
Q = f(P, ...)
P = g(Q, ..)
Modell B nimmt heterogene Gu¨ter an. Ein Markt mit n Gu¨tern beno¨tigt
konsequenterweise eine Angebots- und eine Nachfragefunktion fu¨r jedes dieser
n Gu¨ter.
P1 = f(Q1, ..., Qn, ...)
...
Pn = f(Q1, ..., Qn, ...)
Q1 = g(P1, ..., Pn, ...)
...
Qn = g(P1, ..., Pn, ...)
Ein Resultat der Annahme von differenzierten Gu¨tern ist eine viel gro¨ßere
Anzahl an zu scha¨tzenden Parametern. Ohne jegliche einschra¨nkende An-
nahmen wu¨rde ein n Gu¨termarkt also n2 zu scha¨tzende Parameter bedeuten.
Mit Preis- und Mengendaten allein ist dies schwer zu bewa¨ltigen. Daher
wurden Modelle entwickelt, die Surveydaten von Haushalten, einer viel re-
icherer Quelle, verwenden. Das Aggregationsniveau und (als Konsequenz)
die Datengrundlage stellt einen weiteren wesentlichen Unterschied der bei-
den Modelle dar. Wa¨hrend Modell A Preis- und Mengeninformation der
OECD La¨nder heranzieht - d.h. ein Makromodell ist - verwendet Modell B
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Haushaltsdaten. Dabei wird die Gesamtnachfrage als die Summe u¨ber die
Konsumwahrscheinlichkeiten u¨ber alle Haushalte modelliert:
Qc =
∑
i∈I
P(Haushalt i kauft Produkt c) =
∑
i∈I
Ψ(p1, ..., pn,x1, ...,xn,ωi, θ)
Die Konsumwahrscheinlichkeiten eines Individuums oder eines Haushaltes
liefert ein sogenanntes Discrete Choice Modell. Dieses kann unter Verwen-
dung der beobachtbaren Konsumentscheidungen und einer Reihe von sozio-
o¨konomischen Daten, wie Einkommen, Bildungsstand etc. die Wahrschein-
lichkeiten, daß ein gewisser Konsument ein bestimmtes Gut wa¨hlt, berech-
nen. Hier offenbart sich eine weiter Sta¨rke des zweiten Modells. Wa¨hrend
Modell A von homogenen Konsumenten ausgeht, beru¨cksichtigt Modell B
individuelle Pra¨ferenzen, die mit Hilfe der sozio-o¨konomischen Daten erkla¨rt
werden.
Diese Arbeit beinhaltet einerseits eine Gegenu¨berstellung der genannten
Modelle und analysiert sie auf Sta¨rken und Schwa¨chen, andererseits wird in
den folgenden Kapiteln die Nachfrage fu¨r Internetgu¨ter in O¨sterreich konkret
mit Hilfe eines Nested Logit Modells gescha¨tzt. Hierbei ergaben sich eine
Vielzahl delikater Modellierungsfragen. Diese ko¨nnen durch die folgende
Frage zusammengefasst werden: Wie ko¨nnen die idiosynkratischen Eigen-
schaften des betrachteten Marktes und die Verfu¨gbarkeit von Daten im Rah-
men eines Nested Logit Modells bestmo¨glich beru¨cksichtigt werden?
B Curriculum Vitae
Fabian Schroeder
Curriculum Vitae
Contact
Email: fabian@schroeder.com
Phone: +43 699 122 655 02
Address: Rudolfsplatz 2/32, 1010 Vienna, Austria
Personal Details
Date of birth: 5th of November, 1983
Place of birth: Vienna, Austria
Citizenship: Austrian
Education
Since 10/2006 B.Sc. for Statistics and Mathematics for Economics,
Vienna University of Technology
(B.Sc. Expected Summer 2009)
10/2005–01/2006 Exchange Student at the Universite´ Paris Dauphine
10/2003–03/2009 Mag. soc. oec. der Volkswirtschaftslehre
Equivalent to: M.Sc. in Economics
University of Vienna
Specialisation: Econometrics
2000 Exchange Year at Box Hill School, Surrey U.K.
1993–2001 Do¨blinger Gymnasium BGXIX
Thesis
Demand Estimation with a Model of Discrete Choice; Supervisor: Prof. Dr. B.
Yurtoglu.
Working Experience
Since Mai 2003 Personal and Research Assistant to Prof. John Naisbitt, Fu-
turist, Author
www.naisbitt.com
05/2002–05/2003 Holocaust Memorial Service at the Canadian Jewish Virtual
Museum and Archives, Montreal, Canada
www.cjvma.org
02/2002–04/2002 Holocaust Memorial Service at Yad Vashem, Jerusalem, Is-
rael www.yadvashem.org
Skills
Languages English, German(native), French(advanced)
Computer MSOffice, HTML, Photoshop, LaTeX, MatLab, STATA
Hobbies Saxophon, Travelling, Beachvolleyball
Vienna, 17. Februar 2009
